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l. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing interdependence between regional economies 
is an stylized fact of the world economy during the last two 
decades. The Global Interaction in the international economy 
takes place, at present, mainly through trade channels and 
capital flows. The North-South debate has promoted a rapidly-
progressing literature in this area. Findlay (1980), Chichil-
nisky (198la,198lb) and. Taylor (1981) examine alternative 
models of the world economy where regions are linked through 
trade; Burgstaller and Saavedro-Rivano (1984) and Burgstaller 
(1985) extend further the degree of interdependence in the 
international economy by incorporating capital flows from the 
North to the South. A critical issue analyzed in all these 
articles is the North-South terms of trade endogenous behaviour. 
However, it has be en pointed out that, at the present level 
of global interaction, a two-region classification is perhaps 
too coarse to capture sorne basic questions of interest, see 
Bhagwati (1984), González-Romero (1985) and Kanbur and McIntosh 
(1986). Specifically, Taylor (198l), Adams and Marquez (19B3), 
and González-Romero and Kanbur (1985) call for a finer level 
of disaggregation at the world level in order to investigate 
the crucial role of the oil inputs in the world economy during 
the last decade. 
Here, we examine a neoclassical world economy where markets 
are competitive throughout the world. Since the two most 
important factors in altering the patterns of interdependence 
has been the very substantial growth of world trade and the 
recent enormous expansion of capital flows, we will focus on 
two alternative models: the model of section 2 only allows 
for goods flows; whereas the model of section 3 al so incorpo-
rates perfect capital mobility across regions. Consequently, 
we will be able to detect how the responses of the critical 
variables assuming a world of capital mobility differ from 
those whe1: r.,le assume a VIO'::: le. e:: pe::::ect. capital mobili ty t,.¡h a T' .. 
1. 
the world econorny rnoyes towards world equilibria with higher 
oil prices. with the current fall in oil prices, the topic 
prornises to be relevant for sorne tine, although the direction 
of the shocks has been reversed. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a 
neoclassical three-region rnodel with capital inrnobility, each 
oil irnporting region produces a cornrnodity which is different 
wi th respect to input requirernents, this is where the asyrnetry 
between the two region stops. Despite the cornplex web of 
effects arising in the intersectoral analysis when the oil 
price changes, the endogenous variables of the systern are 
seen to depend on different asyrnetries between oil irnporters 
(Tables 1 and 2). In Section 3, the precise rnodel of Section 
2 incorporates perfect capital rnobility, the oil price shock 
irnpact is now seen to depend crucially upon the type of tech-
nological dualisrn across regions (Tables 3 and 4). Section 4 
concludes the papero 
2 .. A Neoclassical rnodel wi th capital inrnobili ty 
Let us assurne that all three regions are each specialized 
in their production activities. Consequently, the North is 
specialized in an industrial o.uxury-investrnent) cornrnodi ty, 
"steel", the South in a prirnary product, "corn", and OPEe 
specializes in oil production. Technology is .linear in the 
North and also in the South. Two input s are required in 
production, capital and oi1; we assurne no labour for greater 
sirnplicity. aKI(aKA ) and aRI(aRA ) will denote the capital-
output and oil-output coefficients required to produce one 
unit of Northern (Southern) output. Profit-rnaxirnizing behaviour 
of Northern and Southern firrns under perfect cornpetition and 
constant returns to scale will yield cornpetitive prices which 
are set at the level of unit cost: 
2. 
( 1 ) 
(2 ) 
where P
r 
' PA and PR denote the prices of steel, corn and 
oil, respectivelYi rr and r A are the rates of profit in 
the North and South respectively and, rr P
r 
(rA Pr) is the 
user's cost of .capital in the North (South). 
Factor demand Functions will then be linear functions of 
the level of output in each region. We further assume that the 
capital supply in the two regions is an increasing function 
of its own rate of profit (see, Chichilnisky (1980,1981) and 
Heal (1984». 
(3 ) 
( 4 ) 
where SI (Yl) designates the constant capital supply elasticity 
in the North (south). The justification to this assumption is 
to interpret Ki , i = r.,A , as a flow of capital services 
from a given stock of capital, and where profit-maximizing 
capitalists will supply capital services from its stock up to 
when the marginal revenue becomes equal to the marginal cost 
due to the depreciation1 • 
Firstly, we examine a model where interregional capital 
inmobility holds. Hence, since all markets are competitive, 
we have an equilibrium condition for each separate market for 
capital services in the North and South. Thus: 
(5 ) 
( 6) 
3. 
where QI (QA) 
(South) . 
is the steel (corn) output level in the North 
We now draw attention to the dernand side of the two regions. 
We assurne that the pattern of pr.eferences of Northern (Southern) 
agents leads to a proportional expenditure systern, where a 
fraction aI(aA) of expenditure goes on corn whereas the rest 
4. 
1 - al (1 - aA) goes on steel ;.similarl-y, OPEC.' S oilrevenue is assurned 
to be entirely devoted to the consurnption of corn and steel 
in proportions and 1 - a R ' respectively. We also assurne 
that oil extraction costs are negligible; the introduction of 
such costs would be a routine exercise that would not illurninate 
the analysis futher. 
Free trade is assumed, hence the "law of one price" will 
hold. In consequence, theworld rnarkets equilibriurn conditions 
for steel, corn and oil are: 
(7 ) 
Q =,.. A -:r (8 ) 
(9 ) 
where QR designates OPEC's oil supplies which, according to 
(9), adjusts instantaneously to any given level of world dernand 
for oil. 
To surnmar ise, the equa tions (1) - (9) represent OUl:. three 
region rnodel of global interaction. The endogenous variables 
of the rnodel are: PI' PR ' PA ' r I ' r A I KI I KA I QI I QA 
and QR; the rnodel's exogenous variables are the technical 
coefficients (aKI I aKA ' aRI I aRA) and the parameters 
So ' SI ' YO and Y1' denoting the responses of domestic 
factor supplies to prices. 
When all markets are in equilibrium, Walras' Law is always 
satisfied; thus only eight of the nine equations in the model 
are linearly independent. Moreover, the simultaneous equation 
system is homogeneous of degree zero in prices, therefore the 
number of price variables may be reduced by normalization, 
Le. PI = 1 . In suro, we focus on PA , r I ' r A ' KI ' KA ' 
QI ' QA and QR as endogenous variables and trace out this 
2 behaviour for different exogenously fixed values of PR 
The assumption, then, is that OPEe sets the price and supplies 
whatever is demanded. 
We first solve the model to look for the properties of 
the equilibrium: existance, uniqueness and 
tuting for QR from (9), for r I and r A 
stability. Substi-
f rom (1 ) and (2), 
for KI and KA from (3) and (4), and for QI and QA from 
(5) and (6), all into (8), we obtain the model's resolving 
equation in PI ' PA and PR 
PI - a RI PR 
SI 
So ( ) aKI PA(l-aA) + a KA PR (aA - aR) 
= 
+aRI PR (Cl R - aI) 
(10) 
PA - aRA PR 
Y1 PI a I 
YO ( aKA 
) 
Given the normalization PI = 1 , and given PR exogenously, 
equation (10) solves for PA uniquely. Thus, notice that 
taking logarithms of both sides of (10) and differentiating 
with respect to PA , the left-hand side (LHS) is monotonic 
decreasing in PA from infinite, whereas the right-hnnd sido 
(RHS) is monotonic increasing in PA ; therefore, thcrc will 
always exist an intersection point for a unique value of 
PA > O at which both sides atta in identical values
3
. Given 
5. 
the equilibrium solution for PA , from equations (1) and (2) 
we then obtain the equilibrium values for r I and r A ; from 
(3) and (4) KI and KA; from (5) and (6) QI and QA' 
and from (9), QR' This completes the computation of a general 
equilibrium of the North-South-OPEC model. 
Let us now explore the comparative stetic properties of 
the model when the world economy shifts to a new equilibrium 
with a higher oil price 4 . We can first examine the impact on 
the North-South terms of trade PA ; differentiating (10) 
with respect to PR , we obtain: 
(11 ) 
An interpretation of (11) can be provided by noting that, 
first, the term in square brackets on the LHS of (11) denotes 
the walrasian stability properties of the model, see Appendix 
l. Secondly, the RHS of (11) indicates the changes in supply 
and demands for corn as long as the price of corn remains 
unchanged, see Appendix 2. 
Notice that the term in square brackets on the LHS of (11) 
is always positive. Hence the sign of the derivative dPA/dPR 
will depend enterely upon the RHS of (11). Firstly, we make 
the simplest assumptions: we assume that patterns of preference 
are identical across regions and hence so will their spending 
behaviours. We then obtain the following proposition: whenever 
C!.A = C!.R = (XI 
6. 
if then < O (12 ) 
where D is the matrix of technica1 coefficients, 
D = aRA aKI - a KA aRI 
To get futher insight and sharper 
First, 
results, let us make 
the rate of profit in the two fo110wing assumptions. 
the North is lower than in the South, so that if capital is 
free to move it will flow from the North to the South, see 
for instance, Burgstaller and Saavedra-Rivano (1984) and 
Findlay (1984)5. 
Secondly, the supply of capital is at least as responsive 
.to changes in the rate of profit in the North as in the South, 
see for instance Chidhilnisky (1981b); and extreme case of 
this assumption is the special case where the capital supply 
in the South is fixed, i. e. y 1 = O ; the reasons behind this 
assumption may lie either in an overalllow state of confidence 
in the functioning of the Southern economy, i. e. libad news 11 
as Taylor (1985) refers to it, or in a poor functioning and 
inefficient organization of the Southern capital markets. 
Therefore, we conclude 81 r I <:: y 1 r A • In consequence, 
from the proposition (12), we get to: 
if D:> O then 
dPA 
< O dPR 
( 13) 
then 
dPA ~ O dPR if D > O 
Thus, we obtain that the impact of an oil shock on the 
North-South terms of trade depends crucially upon the matrix 
D , the matrix D being a measure of technological dualism 
in the production activities of the North and South. If Northern 
cornmodities are more energy intensive than SoutherncoJTIlllódities 
7. 
(D < O) , then an increase in the world price of oil will 
lead unambiguously to a deterioration of the Southern terms 
of trade. In contrast, technological dualism of the type D > O 
is seen to favour an improvement of the Southern terms of 
trade. 
To see the intuition behind this, let us keep relative 
prices, PA ' constant as a device to trace through the arguments. 
In the first case, when technological dualism is of the type 
D < O , we first examine the rates of profit responses to the 
oil shock, from equations (1) and (2), we get: 
(14 ) 
(15) 
since PA is kept unchanged and D < O I it is inmediate from 
(14) and (15) that the North's capital market will experience 
a larger drop in the rateofprofitthantheSouth's. Therefore, 
as long as capital supply elasticities are the same, the 
decline in Northern output of steel will exceed that of Southern 
output of corn, see equations (5) and (6). Since we have also 
assumed that the capital supply elasticity is higher in the 
North than in the South, then the North's steel output will 
fall even further relative to the South's corn supp1y. Since 
patterns of demand across regions are identical, then the 
obvious fall in world demand for corn, due to the fall in 
incomes, will exceed the reduction in Southern outpu~ leading 
the world market to an excess supply and, given Walrasian 
stability, to a deterioration of the Southern terms of trade 
vis-a-vis the North. 
In the second case, when technologies are more homogeneous 
D = O , and keeping p. constant, from equa tions (14) and (15) 
.c, 
R. 
we obtain an identical negative response of the rates of 
profit in the North and in the South. But, since the capital 
supply elasticity is assumed to be larger in the North than 
in the South, then, finally, the output supply will de crease 
more in the North. There is now excess supply in the world 
market for corn and the relative price of corn will, 
con'sequently, fallo 
In the third case, when the world economy exhibits techno-
logical dilalism of type D > O , then from equations (14) and 
(15) the rate of profit is more responsive to the oil price 
rise in the South than in the North; in consequence, the drop 
in the South's profit rate will be larger than that of the 
North's. But, since capital supply elasticity is higher in 
the North than in the South, then the final relative impact 
on the two output supplies will be ambiguous. Notice that the 
10wer'theSouth's capital supply elasticity and the lower the 
technological dualism between the North and South, the more 
likely it will be that the reduction in output in the North 
exceeds that in the South and, consequently, it will be easier 
to observe a deterioration of the Southern terms of trade. 
Two special conditions are al so interesting to examine. 
since they are sufficient condi tions to observe a deterioration 
of the Southern terms of trade when the oil price rises. If 
the South's capital supply elasticity is zero, Le. Y1 =0 
then capital supply in the South will be fixed and so will 
its output. Since world demand foro corn falls, an excess supply 
in the world market for corn will be observed and, in conse-
quence, the Southern terms of trade will tend to deteriorate. 
Alternatively, if we assume that the South does not employ 
oil as an input in production, aRA = O , as Taylor (1981) does, 
then the technological matrix D vlill be negative, D < O , 
and the Southern terms of trade will unambiguously deteriorate 
(identical result to Taylor (1981». AII these results are 
collected in Table l. 
9 . 
Tab1e 1: Comparative static properties of the mode1 assuming 
identical patterns of preferences. 
dr
r 
drA dPA dKr dKA dQr dQA 
aA = a R = a r dp; dPR dPR dPR dPR dPR dPR 
D < O (-) (- ) (-) (-) (-) (-) H 
D = O (-) (-) H (-) H H (-) 
D > O (-) (+/-) (+/ -) (-) (+ / -) (-) (+/-) 
Yl = O H H (-) (-) H H (- ) 
rf we re1ax the assumption of identica1 pattern of preferences 
across regions, so that aA ~aR ~ a r ' then the situation is 
more complex and a clear cut result is le:ss 1ike1y. Specifica11y, 
we can obtain the following propo$ition: whenever aA > a R > a r 
if and then (16 ) 
Thus, a 1arge elasticity of output supply in the North 
and a small elasticity in the South are seen to favour an 
improvement of the North-South term of trade. This result is 
identical to that obtained by González-Romero and Kanbur (1986), 
who abstract from capital requirements instead of 1abour. 
Horeover, from (16) it is also itneresting to note that the 
net effect depends, crucially upon how consumer preferences 
for stee1 and corn differ across regions (see González-Romero 
and Kanbur (1986) and Harion and Svenson (1986» and upon the 
amp1i tude of these differences (see González-Romero and Ka nbur 
(1986» . 
10. 
If we futher assume that t~e OPEC does 
purchases of Southern commodities, a = O R 
not recycles into 
, as Taylor (1981) 
and Adams and l4arquez (1983) assume, then the condition on 
the supply elasticity S , can be relaxed: whatever happens 
11. 
to Northern output, the decline in Southern and Northern 
demands for corn will dominate the fall in corn output (note 
that Yl must be lower than'a particular parameter especification), 
thus leading to an improvement of the Southern terms of trade. 
Alternatively, if we assume that OPEC does not employ oil, 
aRA = O , then the condition on the supply elasticity y 
can now be relaxed: Southern output does not change whereas 
Northern ouput declines sufficiently ( SI must be greater 
than a particular parameter specification), then the world 
demand for corn will fall, the corn market will experience 
excess supply and hence the Southern terms of trade will 
deteriorate. If the assumption aRA = O is alternatively 
coupled with the assumption a R = al ,as González-Romero 
and Kanbur (1986) assume, then whatever is the supply elasticity 
in the North, the fall in Northern demand due to the declme 
in Northern output will dominate any positive net effect 
of OPEC's demand for corn¡ since Southern output remains 
invariant, the North-South terms of trade will improve. Similarly, 
we obtain identical results when aRA = O and a R = O ; this 
specification is set by Taylor (1981) to infer an improvement 
of the North-South of trade, the same result holds here as a 
particular par ame ter specification of the model~ A surnmary of 
the results is presented in Table 2. 
Tab1e 2 Comparative static properties of the mode1 assuming 
biased consumption towards its own-produced good. 
aA > a R > 
drI drA dPA dkI dKA dQI dqA 
al dPR dPR dPR dPR dPR dPR dPR 
S1 > h and 
a A - a R (-) (- ) (- ) (-) (-) (-) (-) Yl< 1-a A 
aA and a = O (-) (-) (-) (- ) (-) (-) (-) Y1 <1-a R A 
aRA - O 
(-) (-) (-) (- ) (-) (-) (- ) 
and a R = a r or S1 > h 
and 
aRA - O 
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
a R = O 
where h 
1 - aRI PR 
= 1 - a 
I + a P 
al - Cl R RI R 
In sum, we have developed the following overal1 impre'Sion 
of the model with capital inmobility: when the price of oi1 
rises, the model tends to generate, at an initial1y fixed PA, 
a downward pressure on the North's rate of profit larger than 
that of the South's, thus leading to a stronger decline in 
Northern output than in Southern output and consequently, the 
Southern terms of trade vis-a-vis the North will deteriorate. 
This scenario was present in the afterwath of OPEC II, with 
the North experiencing a deep fall in the level of activity 
and the South suffering from a deteriorated terms of trade 
vis-a-vis the North and also from a fallin out,p.ut see van Wijn-
bergen (1985). 
12. 
3. A Neoclassical Model with Perfect Capital Mobility 
A major change from the last section's precise model has 
be en made in order to allow for a complete integration of the 
capital markets in the North and South through capital flows. 
Thus, we allow for perfect capital mobili ty across regions 
and, in consequence, capital flows will take place till rates 
of profit equalize across regions 
r '" r '" r I A ( 17) 
A fundamental implication of (17), is that the two separate 
regional capital markets are integrated into a world capital 
market. Instead of (5) and (6), we nO\"1 have, 
(18 ) 
13. 
Therefore, the model is a general equilibrium system given 
by eight equations, (1) to (4), (7) to (9) and (13), in nine 
endogenous variables, PA , PI ' PR ' r , KI ' KA ' QI ' QA and 
QR • The model differs from that of Burgsteller (1985) in 
assuming a neoclassica1 rather than a Lewisian South. It differs 
from the modelofBurgstaller and Saavedra-Rivano (1984) also 
in assuming fixed coefficients. Of course the major difference 
between our model and those mentioned aboye is that it intro-
duces oil as an input instead of labour, enab1ing us to draw 
attention to the role played by OPEC in the North-South context. 
Walras Law and normalization collapse the model into a 
system of seven linearly independent equations in eight 
unknowns and a numeraire, PI' As in the model of section 2, 
the solutions of the model are obtained by parameterization 
of the world price of oil at a given equilibrium value. First, 
let us examine the crucial differences with the model of 
section 2. Por a fixed PR , from 
obtain the equilibrium values for 
comparative static results: 
dr aR1 
dPR = - aK1 
and 
dPA 
_l_ O dPR 
= aK1 
equation 
r and 
( 1 ) and (2), we 
PA ' and the follm'ling 
( 19 ) 
(20) 
Consequently, once the capital market is integrated, a rise 
in the price of oil will always have a depressive effect on 
the world rate of profit. This response does not depend at 
all on the North-South terms of ttade response as it occurs 
in the model of section 2, where the two regional capital 
markets were not unified. However, the North-South terms of 
trade response will be given by the following proposition 
according as < D > O (21) 
One conclusion inmediately follows: if the oil price increases, 
then the regions that produces and exports the oi1 intensive 
cornmodity will experience a rise in the relative price of its 
exports in terms of its imports. 
There is an interesting point to make here. Notice that 
the comparative static results in the two frameworks,-inter-
regional capital inmobility and perfect capital rnobility, 
are not identical. The difference is explained because of 
capital flows. Specifically, when capital is inmobile, the 
two regional markets for capital were separated¡ hence the 
oil price rise impact will depend upon the different techno-
logical structure throughout the world, but al so will depend 
upon the different degree of capital supplies responsiveness 
to changes in the rate OÍ profit. Thus, for instance, if 
technologies are homogeneous D = O , the oil price rise will 
still affect the Southern term of trade response as long as 
the capital supply elasticities in the two regional markets 
for capital differ. 
In contrast, wheq an integrated world capital market re-
places the two separate regional markets, the oil price shock 
impact on the North-South terms of trade will depend entirely 
upon the type of technological structure across regions. This 
is due to the world capital supply being unique; that is, 
diff~rent capital supplies responses across regions will not 
affect directly its respective output, but through its impact 
on the world supply of capital. Thus, when technologies are 
homogeneous, D = O , the oil shock negative impact on the 
world capital supply will be diversified according to identical 
capi tal-output coefficients in the two regions; correspondingly, 
the North-South terms of trade will remain invariant. 
In the particular case, when capital supply is fixed in 
the South (y 1 = O), the oil price rise impact will only affect 
the world capital supply through its effect on the North's 
capital supply, in this way, the output supplies in the North 
and South will be finally affected according to their respective 
capital-output coefficient. In contrast, in the model of 
section 2 I when y 1 = O I output supply in the South remains 
invariant and, in consequence, the Southern terms of trade 
deteriorate whatever is the technological structure across 
regions. 
Let us now solve the modelo Substituting for r from (1), 
for PA from (2) I for KI and KA from (3) and (4), for QI 
from (8) and for QR from (9) I all into (18) I we obtain the 
model's resolving equation in QA , PI and PR . 
\ r 'O PI - a RI PR SI 1 - a RI PR y 1 l ) ) + YO ( ) I - a KA QA ) aKI aKI 
1"" 
\ 
15. 
r 1 
LPI al + a R1 PR (aR - al) J = 
= aKI QA [( :K~ D + ::~) (1 - a A) + aRA PR (aA - a R)] (22) 
Given the normalization PI = 1 and given PR exogenously, 
it is inmediate that equation (22) solves for the equilibrium 
value of QA uniquely3. We can now compute the complete 
equilibrium of the modelo From (1) and (2) we compute r and 
P A ; gi ven r from (3) and (4) Vle obtain KI and KA and, 
therefore, KW . From (22) we solve for QA' and given Kr 
and KA' from equations (8) and (9) we obtain the equilibrium 
solutions for QI and QR' respectively. Thus the complete 
solution of the North-South-OPEC model is fully determined. 
Let us now explore the comparative static properties of 
the model if it shifts to a new equilibrium with a higher oil 
price. Firstly, the impact on r and PA has been already 
examined, see equations (19) and (20). Secondly, differentiating 
(22) with respect to PR , we get: 
where K = S ( w O 
r 
a l 1 - a RI PR Sr 1 
= - _R_I S S (----==--=..:...) + 
a KI O 1 a Yo Y 1 KI 
(23) 
and, consequentl~ 
y -1 1 1 - a RI PR 1 ( ) < O 
a KI J 
16. 
17. 
that is, an oil price rise Vlill'tend, through a decline in 
the Vlorld rate of profit earned by Northern and southern 
capitalists, to reduce the suppIies of phisical capital services 
to the market. 
Let us now examine the expression (23). The response of 
the Southern output to an oil price change is thus seen to 
depend on a complex set of supply and demand factors. A 
clear interpretation of (23) can be provided by noting 
that the terms of the RHS of (23) denote the impact that a 
change in the world price of oil produces as the supply and 
demands for steel as long as ,,-_: 'o Southern output is kept 
unchanged, see Appendix 4. Once the economy is in desequilibriurn, 
the LHS of (23) denotes the Shouthern output response to the 
disequilibrium produced in the steel market; note that the 
Southern output response will lead the Northern output supply 
and the Vlorld demands for steel torward its new equilibriurn 
since the model exhibits Walrasian stability, see Appendix 3. 
In order to get a better understanding of the essential 
functioning of the world economy, we impose sorne strategic 
assumptions in order to be able to identify the force s set in 
motion, when an exogenous shock takes place. First, let us 
assume that patterns of demand across regions are identical, 
aA = a R = al ; the following proposition holds. 
if D ;;: O then < O (24) 
And the impact on the Northern output of steel will be conse-
quently obtained by differentiating equation (18) and substi-
tuting for dQA/dPR from (23) ... and using aA = a R = al ' we 
obtain: 
(25) 
and there fore 
if D ;¡; O then < O (26) 
Thus, whenever D < O , the Northern commodi ty is relati vely 
energy intensive, an oil price rise will lead to a fall in 
the North's output supply whereas the south's output may or 
may not decline. One conclusion inmediately follows: the only 
region that, when the oil price rises, may benefi t from perfect 
capital mobility is the relatively capital intensive region, 
the South. 
Let us examine briefly the two possible sets of results. 
Firstly, the case when the two output supplies, in the North 
and the South, decline. The argument goes as follows: an oil 
price increase will lead, at a given world rate of profit, to 
-current account deterioration in the North and South; hence 
the volume of oil imports will fall and so will capital demand, 
since they are complementary. Once the profit rate drops, 
capital supply will therefore fall according to the degree of 
Northern and Southern capitalists responsiveness to the decline 
in the profit rateo We also know that if corn is the relatively 
capital intensive commodity, D < O , the Southern terms of 
trade vis-a-vis the North will tend to deteriorate when the 
oil price rises, since the world demand for corn has declined 
and the model exhibits Walrasian stability. then the Southern 
,output of corn will have fallen or may have even risen.lfthe 
fall in world capital supply due to the rise in the price of 
oil is sUfficiently large, then the South will be bound to 
run lower levels of capital demand and hence the Southern 
output will decline. However, if the fall in ,vorld capital 
supply is small and the Northern output is highly energy 
intensive (D is significantly large in absolute value), then' 
the consequent fall in Northern capital demand due to the 
decline in output of steel will outweigh the fall in world 
supply of capital; thus, the So...:t.h w:'2.1 have sorne ~oom to 
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increase capital demand and, consequently the Southern output 
will slightly rise. Figures 1 and 2 describe these two factible 
equilibria in the world markets for corn and steel 8 : 
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In the alternative case when D > O , the Northern commodity 
is now relatively capital intensive, then the argument and the 
results are exactly the opposite. Finally, when D = O , techno-
logies are homogeneous in the North and the South, in this case 
capital demands, and therefore output supplies, lvill decline in 
identical proportion, thus unaltering the North-South tarms of 
trade. A summary of these results is giv8n in Table 3. 
The ambiguous sign of dQA/dPR when D > O , can be 
understood by noting that if we assume that the world supply 
of physical capital services is fixed, i.e. 61 = Y1 = O 
then when dQ D < O, A/dPR = O . That is, if the oil 
price shock has induced a decline in Nothern output without 
altering the world capital supply, then Southern capital 
demand, and hence output, will increase so as to absorb 
the excess supply in the international capital market. Similar 
argument goes when D > O , so that dQr/dPR > O . These results 
are al so included.in Table 3. 
Table 3. Comparative static properties of the model assuming 
identical patterns of preferences. 
dr dPA dKw dQr dQA C!A = C!R = C!r dPR dPR dPR dPR dPR 
D < O (-) (-) (- ) (-) (+/-) 
D = O (-) ( O ) (-) (-) (-) 
D > O (-) (+ ) (-) (+/-) (-) 
D < O (-) (- ) (-) (-) (+ ) 
S = Y1 = O and 1 D > O : (-) (+ ) (-) ( +) ( - ) 
We now draw attention to the general case where demand 
patterns differ across regions. First of all, we should notice 
that the oil price rise impacts on the world rate of profit, 
North-South terms of trade and world capital supply are identical 
whatever is the pattern of consumption assumed. Therefore, the 
2l. 
consumption preferences will only affect the levels of activity 
in the North and South. Let us assume, as in the model of section 
2, that a A > a R > a r is a plausible assumption. The results 
obtained in the model under this assumption are collected in 
Table 4. First, large capital supply elasticities in the North 
and South are seen to favour a decline in Northern and Southern 
output. Alternatively, if these elasticities are zero and we 
also assume that the South does not recycle into purchases of 
Suthern cornmodities, a R = O , then the oil price rise impact 
will again depend upon the type of technological dualismo between 
North and South. 
rf we'futher assume that the South does not use oil as an 
input, aRA = O (and therefore D < O ), then the oil price 
rise will have an ambiguous impact on Northern and Southern 
output. Moreover, if we also assume that OPEC does not recycle 
into the consumption of southern cornmodities, a R = O , the 
effects are not clear cut either. Southern and Northern demands 
for corn will decline whereas Southern supply will al so fall, 
the final impact on Southern output will be therefore unclear 
and so will the impact on Northern output (see Appendix 4 using 
aRA = O and a R = O ). 
Table 4 : Comparative static properties of the model assuming 
biased consumption towards its own-produced good. 
CtA > Ct R > a r 
dr dPA dKw dQr dQA 
dPR dPR dPR dPR dPR 
SI and Y1 strong 
sufficiently (-) (-) (-) (-) 
lar e 
¡O" (-) (+ ) (O) (+ ) (-) S = y = O D=O (- ) (O) (O) (+ ) (- ) 1 1 
and Ct = O D < O (-) (- ) (O) (+/-). (+/ -) R 
aRA = O (D < O) iH (-) H (+/- ) (+/- ) 
a = O (D < 01
1 
and RA (- ) H (+/-) (+/-) 
Ct = O R 
. . H 
The overall impression of the model with perfect capital 
mobility is that under plausible assumptions, when the oil 
price rises, the model tends to genera te a drop in the world 
rate of profit and a deterioration of the North-South terms 
of trade, Northern output will unambiguously fall whereas 
Southern output may or may not decrease. This scenario repres-
ents a good description of the world economy response after 
OPEC I, when Northern economies exhibit a high degree of oil 
dependence, a strong declin'e in the world rates of profi t 
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took place and Southern cornmodity prices in real terms fell 
dramatically, the North suffered an output contraction whereas 
the South managed tomaintain or even raise i ts level of acti vi ty. 
See Sachs (1979) and van wijnbergen (1985). It is also clear 
that depending on the type and degree of technological dualism, 
for a given decrease in the world capital supply the levels of 
activity in the North and South are inversely related. 
4. Conlusion 
It has been argued, see for instance Sachs (1979) and van 
Wijnbergen (1985) that after the first oil shock in 1973/74, 
OPEe I, persistent OPEe surpluses were recycled largely to 
the developing countries through a major change in the structure 
of capital flows between industrial and developing countries. 
This change allowed the developing countries to increase capi tal 
demand and, consequently, to maintain or even raise its level 
of activity. However, after the second oil shock in 1979/80, 
OPEe II, OPEe surpluses were short lived and not only the 
industrial countries carne' into a very deep contraction, but 
also the developing countries reduced output, see van Wijnbergen 
(1985). In this paper we have attempted to explore this argument 
in the context of a general equilibrium model with perfect 
capital mobility and, alternatively, capital inmobility. We 
explore the impact of an oil price rise on major macro variables 
0= the impc~ter econornies. The two sCenarios highlight the 
alternative parameters that will be crucial in determining 
the comparative static results. Under perfect capital mobility 
the type of technological dualism between the North and South 
is highly critical for the results. Under perfect capital 
inmobili ty, the model emphasizes mainly supply elastici ties and, 
al so the type and degree of technological dualism and the 
degree of OPEC's recycling into Southern cornmodities. 
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The model with capital inmobility is capable of generating, 
under plausible assumptions, an improvement in the North-South 
terms of trade and a downward pressure on the North and South 
rates of profit, thus leading to a fall in activity in the two 
oil importing regions, larger in the North. This seems to 
represent the stylized facts in the world economy aftermath of 
OPEC II. The model with perfect capital mobility is also able 
to generate, under plausible assumptions, a deterioration of 
the Southern terms of trade vis-a-vis the North and a decline 
in the world rate of profit and the level of activity in the 
North, however, the output of the other oil importer region, 
the South, may or may not decline. This alternative scenario 
is a better description of the response 9f the world economy 
after OPEC r. The strength of the results lie, in the fact 
that we, with the help of the model, are able to see the basic 
interrelationships between supply and demand factors in the 
oil price rise process. 
I hope the analysis al so help us, firstly, understanding 
the reasons (the parameters highlighted) why regions respond 
differently to the same external shock and, secondly, noting 
that from differents regimes of capital mobility we should 
derive alternative policy implications. Thus, for instance, 
we have found that for a particular parameter specification, 
one of the two oil importers regions may benefit from an oil 
shock under a regime of perfect capital mobility. 
Footnotes 
1.- A formal justification of the capital supply functions 
can be found if we assume that the physical depreciation 
of the machine is an increasing and convex function of 
the machine services, see Mahran (1984). 
2. - Notice that the variable we choose as a ·model closure does 
not affect at all either the equilibrium solutions of the 
model or its comparative static properties. For futher 
details, see Heal (1984). 
3.- The posibility of factor prices requires the price of oil 
to be bounded: 1 
4.- Despite of analyzing the effects of an oil price rise, the 
analysis of an oil price decrease merely involves a change 
in the sign of the results which are symmetric. 
5.- Note that and Q~(R) , i = I,A , designate 
.lo 
the Northern, Southern and OPEC's 
Q~ the supply for that good, and 
demand for good i, and 
Q~ the wor1d demando 
24. 
6.- Capital is inmobile in this modelo The model in section 3 
incorporates capital mobility. Rental differential will be 
necessary for capital to flow. And as Findlay (1984) points 
out: 
"If capital is free to mov.e in either direction, it is 
natural to suppos.e that the incentive is for it to 
flow from North to South". 
7.- In order to understand these exercises, it is useful to 
incorporate the assumptions we make in Appendix 2. 
25. 
8.- The world demand schedules for corn and steel have be en 
drawn under the assumption that they are downward sloping, 
however they might be upward sloping ,but since the markets 
are Walras stable the final effects are not altered by this 
assumption. 
- Al -
Appendix 1: Stabilitv under capital inmobilíty5 
A rather common approach to stability in trade theory is 
to assume that domes tic factor prices rema in at their equili-
brium values and factor markets clear, therefore the burden 
of the adjustment is placed on the ínternational markets. 
Furthermore, in the world market for oil, oil producers fix 
the price and supply whatever is demanded, hence this market 
is also always in equilibrium. In consequence, the emphasis 
of the adjustment is finally placed on the two international 
commodity markets. Of course, if one of the two markets is 
stable, the other market will also be stable by Walras Law. 
Our stabili ty analysis focus on the \.¡orld market for corn, 
First, let us define excess supply in this market as: 
walrasian stability in the corn market will require 0'(PAl > O 
> O 
Substituting, we obtain the following derivatives: 
= O 
- A3 -
= 
= -
Adding up these therms, we obtain: 
= 
Notice that the terms in square brackets have an ambiguous 
signo Note further that the terms in square brackets correspond 
identically with the RHS of (11). 
- A2 -
Adding up these terms and rearranging, we finally have: 
and obviously 0A(PA) > o always. Hence the world market for 
corn is Walras stable and so will the world market for steel. 
Notice that the terms in square brackets are identical to 
those in square brackets on the LHS of equation (11). 
Appendix 2: An oil price shock5 
We know that the corn world market equilibrium requires: 
In consequence, if an oil price shock takes place, the 
corn world market adjustment to the new equilibrium will be 
defined by: 
where oQD 8QS 
A A 
dPA 8PR PA 8PR PA 
= dPR 8QS A 3QD A 
-- -
oPA 3PA 
Notice that the denominator is positive since the model presents 
Walrasian stability (see Appendix 1). Let us find out the numera-
tor: 
A4 
Appendix 3: Stabilitv under perfect capital rnobilityS 
To study the stability properties of the rnodel, we use 
the sarne approach as in Appendix 1. Therefore, the burden of 
the adjustrnent is placed on the two international cornrnodity 
rnarkets. We now concentrate on the world rnarket for steel. We 
define excess supply in this rnarket as: 
walrasian stability in the steel rnarket will require ¡;j'(QA) < O 
< O 
Substituting, we obtain the following derivatives: 
Adding 
¡;j' (QA) 
= 
= -
. Q 
I 
up these terrns and 
QI r-
a KA 
= Kw-aKAQA 
rearranging we obtain: 
__ 1 l 
QA J 
, L 
·e 
I 
, 
\ ',- '( 
I 
. 1, l 
,--, 
l l.;>' 
\ t1u ~ \ .- --_. 
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and obviously 0' (QA) < O always. In conclusion, the world 
market for steel is Wa1ras stab1e and so wi11 the wor1d market 
for corno Notice that the terms in square brackets are identical 
to those in square brackets on the LHS of equation (23) with 
changed signs. 
Appendix 4: An 011 price shockS 
We know that the stee1 wor1d market equi1ibrium requires: 
Therefore, if the oi1 price changes, the wor1d market for 
stee1 wi11 adjust to the new equilibrium according to: 
where 
3QD I I 
16A dQA 3PR 
dPR 
= 
3QS 
I 
-- -
8QA 
oQS 
I 
- 3PR 
3QD 
I 
8QA 
I 
QA 
dQ· 
A 
.---
dPR 
Notice that the denominator is negative since the model presents 
Wa1rasian stability (see Appendix 3). Let us examine the numerator: 
A6 
Adding up these terms, we obtain: 
= 
Notice that the term in square brackets has an ambiguous signo 
Note further that the terms in square brackets are identical 
to the RHS of (23) with changed signs. 
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